Truth Conditions for Indicative Conditionals . Robert Stalnaker’s () account is of this type: consider a possible situation in which you touch. Yet if it is a valid inference, then the indicative conditional conclusion must be logically For a fuller discussion and defense of this concept, see Stalnaker. The problem is that if one accepts the validity of the intuitively reasonable direct argument from the material conditional to the ordinary indicative conditional.

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In two special cases, they are equal: Do we escape Lewis’s result that a conditional probability is not the probability of the truth of any proposition, by making the proposition expressed by a conditional context-dependent? You look sceptical but stay outside, when there is large crash as the roof collapses. My conditional probability for consequent given antecedent is high. I told you so.

I can consistently be close to certain that it’s not the case that I will be hit by a bomb and injured today, while thinking it highly unlikely that if I am hit by a bomb, I won’t be injured.

DeRose on the Conditionals of Deliberation. A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference.

Indicative Conditionals – Oxford Scholarship

But we want more than synonyms. Conditional commands can, likewise, be construed as having the force of a command of the consequent, conditional upon the antecedent’s being true.

The direct way is to imagine that we know for sure that the premise is true, and to consider what we would then think about the conclusion. The lines of a truth table constitute a partition. Someone asks me whether the match will go ahead. It is very close to certain that if you toss the coin ten times, you will get at least conditionnals head; but it is certainly false that the consequent is true at all nearest antecedent-worlds.

  TM 4700-15 PDF

He seems to advocate an error theory of conditionals: There may, of course, be further consequences of this feature of Hook’s theory which jar with intuition. Byrne – – Psychological Review 4: Perhaps it is an account of how we should use conditionals, and would nidicative we were free from error: Still, straightforward statements about the past, present or future, to which a conditional clause is attached — the traditional class of indicative conditionals — do in my view constitute a single semantic kind.

For instance, I’m to pick a ball from a bag.

Indicative Conditionals

You rule out line 1, nothing more. On the truth-functional interpretation, the nurse can claim that he was carrying out the doctor’s order. They also point out that some constructions are rarer, and harder to understand, and more peculiar, than would be expected if conditionals had truth conditions and embedded in a standard way.

The probability of B on the supposition that A is the proportion of the A -chunks the chunks in which A is true which are B -chunks.

Then we discover that at least one of them is at home nothing stronger. Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. If an argument is necessarily truth-preserving, the improbability of its conclusion cannot exceed the sum of the improbabilities of the premises.

We cannot speak of a conditional sentence being true or false at a world, simpliciter, for that leaves open which the nearest A -world is. I am asked where John is. Bennett changed his mind. Frank Ramsey put it like this: The history of the conditional is the history of a syntactic mistake. The conception of validity we have been using PPP takes as central the fact that premises are accepted with degrees of confidence less than certainty. Logic and Semantics for Imperatives.


Context and Content Author s: Would we gain anything from following this prescription? So 3 is a logical truth. There does not seem to be any independent motivation for thinking the content of the proposition has changed. We read 2 as equivalent to 1hence also unassailable.

What is the difference between the roles of a premise, and of the antecedent of a conditional in the conclusion?

Robert Stalnaker, Indicative conditionals – PhilPapers

Someone conjectures that if Ann isn’t home, Bob is. Is it plausible to say that this is doing what she was asked to do, albeit not in the intended way?

Not in a way that accords well with intuition, we have seen. Hook’s theory has the unhappy consequence that all conditionals with unlikely antecedents are likely to be true. There is no two-place if … then connective in the logical forms of natural languages. Consider first conditionals which contain a modal term: Three kinds of theory will be discussed. See also Stalnaker We now accept the conditional. Philosophical Papers Volume 2Oxford: The latter clearly is obeying the command, but not in the intended manner.